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Abstract: We incorporate an uncoordinated redistributive struggle for extra fiscal privileges into an 
otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The main aim is to get model-
consistent quantitative evidence of the extent of rent seeking. Our work is motivated by the 
common belief that interest groups compete with each other for privileged transfers, subsidies and 
tax treatments at the expense of the general public interest. The model is calibrated to the euro area 
as a whole, and to individual euro member-countries, over the period 1980-2003. We find that an 
important proportion of tax revenue is appropriated by rent seekers and that the introduction of rent 
seeking moves the model in the right direction vis-à-vis the data. 
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Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of winning a contestable prize; or the case in which 
people use private resources to gain an advantage in dividing up the benefits of economic activity. 
When self-interested individuals are involved in rent seeking activities, their private returns come 
from redistribution of wealth from others rather than from wealth creation, and so the aggregate 
economy stagnates. At the heart of the problem, there is a common pool, prisoners’ dilemma 
situation.
1 
Rent seeking occurs mainly through the public sector. It is commonly believed that the 
monopoly rent that governments create - via coercive taxation, regulation, etc - generates a prize 
worth pursuing (see e.g. Tanzi, 1998, Mueller, 2003, and Hillman, 2003). Focusing on rent seeking 
through the public sector, an important form is competition for higher subsidies and transfers, lower 
taxes and other extra fiscal privileges, or what we call rent-seeking competition from state coffers.    
In this paper, we incorporate rent-seeking competition from state coffers into an otherwise 
standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. We then calibrate the model to 
the euro area over the period 1980-2003. We expect that such political economy considerations can 
contribute to explaining the European experience in cycles and growth. We also aim to get 
quantitative evidence of the fraction of social resources extracted by rent seekers. 
A key feature of our model is that the state collects tax revenue to finance public goods and 
services, but each self-interested individual uses a part of his/her non-leisure (i.e. effort) time to 
extract a fraction of that revenue for his/her own personal benefit.
2 The amount extracted by each 
individual is proportional to the effort he/she allocates to rent seeking relative to the aggregate 
effort allocated to rent seeking by all individuals. In equilibrium, the total amount extracted from 
state coffers increases with per capita economy-wide rent seeking effort. This redistributive struggle 
can hurt the macro-economy both directly and indirectly: the direct effect arises because there are 
few resources available to finance public infrastructure and other socially useful services; the 
indirect effect arises because the possibility of extraction distorts individuals’ incentives by pushing 
them away from productive work. This indirect effect is also known as “directly unproductive 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Tullock (1967, 1980), Krueger (1974), Bhagwati (1982), Becker (1983), Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. 
(1991). For reviews of the literature on rent seeking, see Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Mueller (2003) 
and Hillman (2003). 
2 This goes back to Becker (1983). Drazen (2000, chapters 10 and 11) reviews the literature on how interest groups 
compete with each other for extra transfers in dynamic setups. More recent papers include Mohtadi and Roe (2003), 
Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005). In all these models, the “common pool” is (some type of) government income.     
  1profit-seeking” (see Bhagwati, 1982) or as “misallocation of talent” (see Murphy et al., 1991). Both 
effects can reduce the prize that initiated the struggle in the first place. 
We calibrate the model both to the euro area as a whole, and to individual EU-12 countries 
(i.e. the European countries that have adopted the euro). There are three main results.  
First, we get quantitative information on the macroeconomic implications of rent seeking 
activities. For instance, in the euro area as a whole, rent seekers grab 18.07% of the collected tax 
revenue. This translates to 7.01% of output. In other words, redistributive transfers due to rent 
seeking (in the form of privileged spending subsidies and tax treatments) amount to 7.01% of 
output produced. At individual country level, Ireland and the Netherlands score the best (essentially 
zero rent seeking) being closely followed by Finland. At the other end, Greece, Portugal and Italy 
score the worst being followed by Germany (after the reunification), where the fraction of the 
collected tax revenue grabbed is respectively 53%, 52%, 32% and 26%. This amounts to 16%, 13%, 
12% and 10% of each country’s GDP respectively.  
Second, sensitivity analysis can shed some light on the relationship between the size of 
government and the extent of rent seeking activities. In our model, the latter depends on almost all 
exogenous variables and calibrated parameters; the size of government is just one of them. For 
instance, despite their high tax rates and large public sectors, Finland and the Netherlands enjoy 
very low rent seeking thanks to their good “institutional quality” (where the latter is a calibrated 
model parameter defined below). Greece and Portugal do very badly because of poor institutional 
quality; their tax rates are low. Rent seeking in Germany seems to be driven by high tax rates; its 
institutions are not that bad. Thus, high tax rates and large public sectors are not bad per se.
3       
Third, the introduction of rent seeking incentives moves the model in the right direction vis-
à-vis the data. In particular, our model does well in reproducing the key stylized facts of business 
cycles in the euro area and, more importantly, it scores better than the same model without rent 
seeking in terms of volatility in hours at work. The latter is a statistic that standard RBC models 
find it difficult to match (see e.g. the review papers by King and Rebelo, 1999, and Hall, 1999).  
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. A quantitative study is in 




                                                 
3 This may explain the non-conclusive evidence on the relationship between government size and measures of rent 
seeking activities. For instance, Park et al. (2005) provide evidence of a positive correlation between fiscal size and rent 
seeking in 108 countries, and Glaeser and Saks (2006) find a weak positive relationship between bigger governments 
and corruption using data for states in the US. On the other hand, Treisman (2000) reports that measures of government 
size are not significantly related with corruption in a world sample, and Fisman and Gatti (2002) report that a higher 
government share in GDP is reducing corruption in a sample of both developed and developing countries.    
  22. Theoretical model  
 
2.1 Description of the model   
There is a large number of identical households and (for simplicity) an equal number of identical 
firms. Households own capital and labour and rent them to firms. They are also engaged in rent-
seeking competition with each other for fiscal privileges.
4 Rent seeking can come at a private cost: 
it requires effort (non-leisure) time.
5 Thus, in addition to consumption, leisure and saving, each 
household also chooses optimally how to allocate its non-leisure time between productive work and 
rent-seeking activities.
6 Firms produce a homogenous product by using capital, labour and public 
infrastructure. The government imposes income and consumption taxes, but a fraction of tax 
revenue can be grabbed by rent seekers. The government uses the remaining tax revenue, plus the 
issue of new bonds, to finance three standard activities: public consumption goods and services that 
provide direct utility to households, public investment that augments the stock of public 
infrastructure and provides production externalities to firms, and a uniform lump-sum transfer to 
each household.   
It is worth pointing out two features of the model. First, the contestable prize is the 
monopoly rent or income that the government creates via coercive taxation. In turn, self-interested 
agents use their private resources to compete with each other for a share of this prize. Second, each 
household can receive both a uniform lump-sum (non-distorting) transfer and an extra (distorting) 
fiscal favour. The former is standard in the literature and reflects the idea that there are government 
programs independent of interest groups’ pressure (this can be related to social and political norms). 
The latter depends on the effort individuals spend in rent seeking activities and reflects the idea that 
fiscal privileges are provided only if the beneficiaries of those privileges apply pressure.
7  
                                                 
4 We could assume that firms rent seek like households. This is not important since households are firm-owners in this 
class of models. We could also assume that government officials rent seek. Again, this is not important conceptually; 
from the viewpoint of self-interest, government officials do not differ from other individuals so that by adding more 
types of rent-seeking individuals would not change our main results. Nevertheless, if policy decisions are optimally 
made, introducing optimizing rent-seeking government officials would complicate the algebra considerably. Thus, like 
Becker (1983), we take policy decisions as given. See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Eggert and Sorensen 
(2007) for optimal behaviour of “corrupt” government officials, although in simpler setups. See also Park and 
Philippopoulos (2004), Park et al. (2005) and Malley et al. (2007) for optimal fiscal policies.  
5 Trade unionism, participation in strikes and demonstrations, establishing connections, lobbying, paying lawyers and 
campaign contributions, etc, are costly activities. In general, rent seeking (winning a contestable prize) requires the 
expenditure of private resources (time, money or both). Note that instead of assuming that each individual devotes effort 
time to rent seeking, we could assume that it pays bribes to the government to influence fiscal favors in its favor; this is 
not important to the main results.     
6 This goes back to e.g. Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991) and many others, where individuals decide how to allocate 
their activities between socially productive ones (e.g. work, innovation, entrepreneurship) and socially unproductive 
ones (e.g. rent seeking, poaching, breaking the law).  
7 See e.g. Mueller (2003, chapter 21) and Hillman (2003, chapter 6) for interest groups, transfers and the size of the 
government. See also Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 7) for special-interest politics.  
  3In what follows, we formalize the above scenario. Before we do so, we discuss what we 
mean by privileges or favours.    
 
2.2 What do we mean by privileges or favours?  
We can classify privileges into two categories. The first includes privileged transfers, subsidies and 
tax treatments. For instance, there are direct transfers in cash (e.g. targeted subsidies and other 
benefits) and non-cash (e.g. private use of public assets like state cars, extra health services and 
child benefits, etc), as well as indirect transfers (e.g. measures that increase the demand for an 
interest group’s services). There are also measures that reduce tax burdens (e.g. tax exemptions and 
loopholes designed to favor special interests) coupled with a rise in the average tax rate to make up 
for the lost revenues. The second category includes privileged regulation and legislation that reduce 
competition (e.g. government-created barriers to entry, trade restrictions like tariffs and agricultural 
price supports) or lead to disguised transfers (e.g. a public road may be planned to increase the 
value of certain pieces of real estate). Obviously, this list is not exhaustive (see Tanzi, 1998, 
Mueller, 2003, chapter 15, and Hillman, 2003, chapter 6, for more examples).  
Although our model is conceptually consistent with both categories of privileges, formally 
speaking, we model the first category. Note that rent seeking can also take illegal forms (e.g. tax 
evasion, use of fake documents to get a privileged treatment).  
 
2.3 Households 
Each period   there are   identical households indexed by the superscript  , where  . 
The population size,  , evolves at a constant rate 
t t N h t N h ,..., 2 , 1 =
t N 1 ≥ n γ  so that  t n t N N γ = +1 , where   is 
given. The expected lifetime utility of household h is: 
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where   denotes rational expectations conditional on the information set available at time zero, 
 is a time discount factor,   is  ’s  private consumption at time t, 
0 E
1 0




t G  is average (per 
household) public consumption goods and services provided by the government at  , and  t
h
t L  is h’s 
leisure time at t. Thus, public consumption goods and services influence private utility through the 
value of the parameter ψ  (see e.g. Aschauer, 1985, and Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992).  
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where  1 0 < < μ  and  0 ≥ σ  are parameters.  
Each household h saves in the form of capital,  , and government bonds,  . It receives 
interest income from capital,  , and government bonds,  , where   and   are 
respectively the gross returns to inherited capital and bonds,    and  . The household has one 


















t L , and effort,  . Thus,   in 
each period. It further divides its effort time  , between productive work,  , and rent seeking 
activities,  , where   and   are respectively the fractions of non-
leisure time that the household allocates to productive work and rent seeking. Thus, 
 in each period.
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8 Finally, each household receives a share of profits,  , 
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where   and   are respectively consumption and income tax rates common to all 
agents,
1 0 < ≤
c
t τ 1 0 < ≤
y
t τ
9   is the wage rate,   is labour-augmenting technology common to all households that 
evolves at a constant rate 
t w t Z
1 ≥ z γ  so that  t z t Z Z γ = +1  where   is given,   denotes 
government tax revenue (specified below) and 
0 0 > Z t R
1 0 < ≤ t θ  is the economy-wide degree of extraction 
(also specified below).   
The budget constraint in (3) is standard except for the last term on its right-hand side. The 
idea behind this term is that, given a contestable prize denoted as  tt R θ , each self-interested agent 
attempts to extract a fraction of that prize, where the fraction depends on the amount of time and 
effort that an individual agent allocates to rent seeking relative to the time and effort allocated by all 
agents in the society. This is a standard rent-seeking technology (see Mueller, 2003, chapter 15). As 
Mueller points out, this standard model of rent seeking largely abstracts from institutional or 
                                                 
8 Since both   and  are optimally chosen, this is equivalent to choosing how to allocate one’s time to the three 





9 We assume that returns on government bonds are not taxed.  
  5political details. Under this modeling, specific redistribution mechanisms are replaced by a 
“technology” of redistribution.    
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where the initial  0
h B  is given. 
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where the parameter   is a depreciation rate and the initial  1 0 < <
p δ 0
h K  is given.    
Each household   acts competitively by taking prices, policy and economy-wide variables 
as given.
h
10 Thus, each   chooses  h 11 {, , , , }
hh h h h
tt t t t t CH K B η 0
∞
+ +=  to maximize (1)-(2) subject to (3)-(5), 
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10 Each individual   is small by taking economy-wide variables ( h t θ ,   and  ) as given. We could 
alternatively assume that each   internalizes the effects of his/her own actions on aggregate outcomes by taking only 











) 1 ( η
h
h j ≠  as given. This is not important regarding the features of a decentralized equilibrium. 
What is important is that there are (social) external effects.    
  6Condition (6a) is the optimality condition with respect to effort time, 
h
t H , and equates the 
marginal value of leisure to the after-tax return to effort. Condition (6b) is the optimality condition 
with respect to the fraction of non-leisure time allocated to work vis-à-vis rent seeking, 
h
t η . It 
implies that, in equilibrium, the return to work and the return to rent seeking should be equal. The 
next two conditions, (6c) and (6d), are standard Euler equations for  1
h
t K +  and  1
h
t B + . The optimality 
conditions are completed by the transversality conditions for the two assets, namely 
0
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2.4 Firms 
There are as many firms as households. Identical firms are indexed by the superscript  f , where 
1,2,..., t f N = . Each firm produces an homogeneous product, 
f
t Y , by using private capital, 
f
t K , 




t K . Its production function is: 
 
ε α ε α − − =








t K Q K A Y  (7) 
 
where   is stochastic total productivity (see below for its law of motion) and  0 > t A 1 , 0 < < ε α  are 
parameters (see e.g. Lansing, 1998, for a similar production function). 
Each firm  f  acts competitively by taking prices, policy and economy-wide variables as 
given. Thus, each  f  chooses 
f
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  72.5 Government budget constraint  
In each period, the government provides public consumption,  , public investment,  , and lump-






t G t R  by taxing consumption and 
income at the rates   and   respectively. Rent seekers can grab  1 0 < ≤
c
t τ 1 0 < ≤
y
t τ tt R θ , where the 
fraction 0 1 t θ ≤<  is modelled below. The government also issues new bonds,  . Then, the 
government budget constraint at   is: 
1 + t B
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1 1 1 1
η τ τ tt R θ  can 
be read as both government revenue taken away (i.e. privileged tax treatments) and extra benefits 
recorded as expenditure (i.e. privileged spending subsidies). See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p.16) 
for a discussion of this equivalence between “tax expenditures” and “spend expenditures”.   
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where 0  is a depreciation rate and initial 1
g δ << 0
g K  is given. 
 
2.6 Exogenous stochastic variables and policy instruments   
The exogenous stochastic variables include the aggregate productivity,  , and five policy 
instruments,  . We assume that productivity and policy instruments (in rates) 
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where  ,  are means of the stochastic processes;  0 A
c y t i c s s s 0 0 0 0 0 , , , , τ τ a ρ , c y t i g ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ , , , ,  are first-
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2.7 Economy-wide extraction  
To close the model, we specify the economy-wide degree of extraction ( 1 0 < ≤ t θ ). Following e.g. 
Zak and Knack (2001), Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005), we assume that  t θ  increases with per 
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θ θ  (13) 
 
where the parameter  0 0 ≥ θ  is a technology parameter that translates individual rent-seeking efforts 
into actual extraction. Its value reflects social norms (see subsection 3.2 below for details). 
 
2.8 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) 
In a Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE): (i) Each individual household and each 
individual firm maximize respectively their own utility and profit by taking as given market prices, 
government policy and economy-wide outcomes. (ii) Markets clear via price flexibility.
12 (iii) The 
government budget constraint is satisfied. This equilibrium holds for any feasible policy. Note that 
since atomistic individuals have ignored social externalities, the DCE is inefficient vis-à-vis the 
social planner’s solution where there is no rent seeking (see Park et al., 2005, for details). 
                                                 
11 We could use a non-linear specification. Or treat  t θ  as exogenous. This would not affect our main predictions (see 
Park et al., 2005, for details).    
12 Thus, in each time period,   in the capital market,   in the labor market, 
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1
  9We solve for a symmetric DCE. Equilibrium quantities will be denoted by letters without 
the superscripts h (which was used to indicate quantities chosen by households) and  f  (which was 
used to indicate quantities chosen by firms).  
The DCE is given by equations (1)-(13). Looking ahead at the long run where all components 
of the national income identity should grow at the same constant rate (the so-called balanced growth 
rate), we transform these components in per capita and efficient unit terms to make them stationary. 


















h ≡  to be per capita non-leisure time. It is then straightforward to 
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where  . We thus have nine equations in the paths of  . 
This is given the paths of productivity,  , and the independent policy instruments,  , 
whose motion has been defined above in (12a-f). 
1 ) 1 ( * − − ≡
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3. Calibration and long-run results   
  10 
We start by calibrating the model to the euro zone area as a whole. Our data source is the updated 
AWM dataset constructed by Fagan et al. (2001). Data are quarterly and cover the period 1980:1-
2003:4.
13 We also calibrate the model to individual EU-12 countries. In this case, we use annual 
data from the OECD Economic Outlook database.    
 
3.1 Calibration and long-run solution for the euro zone  
Tables 1 and 2 report the average values of the time-series in the AWM dataset, calibrated 
parameter values and the resulting long-run solution. The economy in the long run is presented in 
Appendix A.   
 
Tables 1 and 2 here 
 
Table 2, column 1, reports the average values of  ,  ,   and   in the data, while 
the average quarterly real interest rate on public debt, 
y c/ y i/ h / by
b r , is   which means an annual value 
of  . Since data on hours at work are not available for the euro zone, the series of   is 
computed as in Correia et al. (1995) and Kollintzas and Vassilatos (2000) and its average value is 
found to be  .
0089 . 0
036 . 0 t h
3713 . 0 = h
14 The average values of tax rates in the data are in Table 1. The income tax 
rate,  , is obtained as the ratio of the collected income tax revenue over GDP, while the 
consumption tax rate,  , as the ratio of collected indirect tax revenue over private consumption. 





Our model includes some variables that – although clearly identifiable from a theoretical 
point of view – are hard to measure. Specifically, there are no data on the fraction of effort time 
devoted to rent seeking  ) 1 ( t η − and thus on time devoted to productive work ( t th η ). Besides, public 
finance data do not distinguish between government spending arising from rent seeking activities 
and government spending independent of such activities; the data obviously contain both types, 








15 These measurement problems arise in the calibration process only. To deal with them, 
                                                 
)
13 This dataset starts in 1970. We follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and Andres et al. (2006) in using data after 1980. 
See also Trabandt and Uhlig (2005) for a DSGE model of the European Economy.   
14 Total employment is equal to the employment rate multiplied by the labour force. On the assumption that there are 
7x14 hours per week and the average working week is 40 hour, labour hours are obtained if we multiply total 
employment by the factor 40/(7x14).  
15 We are grateful to Harald Uhlig for pointing this problem out to us. This implies that in the government budget 
constraint in equation (10), if we use the available data on government spending to measure  ,   and  , and in 







( tt R θ , we may have a double-counting problem. We thus have to deal with this 
  11we assume that (a) any effort devoted to rent seeking takes place while at work; (b) in the data, any 
spending favors take the form of redistributive transfers. Assumption (a) reflects the popular view 
that trade unionism, etc, are at the cost of actual hours of work (thus, we distinguish hours at work 
, which is measurable, from hours of productive work  t h t th η , which is unobservable). Assumption 
(b) is consistent with e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), who argue that in the past thirty to forty 
years government spending growth has mainly been driven by interest groups and has taken the 
form of transfers/subsidies. In practice, these two assumptions mean that, in Appendix A, only two 
equations, (A.v) and (A.viii), are left with unobservable variables and hence not used for calibration 
purposes, while the government budget constraint (A.vi) becomes (A.vi’). 
Some parameter values in Table 1 are set on the basis of a priori information. Following 
usual practice, the curvature parameter in the utility function (σ ) is set equal to  . The parameter  2
ψ , which measures the degree of substitutability/complementarity between private and public 
consumption in the utility function, is set equal to 0; as Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) explain, 
this means that government consumption is equivalent to a resource drain in the macro-economy. 
Since quarterly population data for the euro zone as a whole are not available, we assume away 
population growth,  1 = n γ . The private and public capital depreciation rates,   and  , are both 
set equal to 0.025 (implying 0.10 annually), which are the values also used by Smets and Wouters 
(2003). The exponent of public capital in the production function (
p δ
g δ
ε α − − 1 ) is set equal to  , 
which is the average public investment to output ratio ( ) in the data (Baxter and King, 1993, do 
the same for the US). Following Kydland (1995), we set 
0295 . 0
i s0
μ  (the weight given to consumption 
relative to leisure in the utility function) equal to the average value of   (see above). Both   (the 
initial level of technical progress) and   (the level of long-run aggregate productivity) are scale 
parameters and are normalized to one (see also e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). The growth rate of the 
exogenous labor augmenting technology, 
t h 0 Z
0 A
z γ , is 1.0088, which is the average GDP growth rate of 
the Euro zone member countries during 1960-2003.  
The time discount factor (β ) is calibrated from equation (A.iii). The capital share (α ) is 
calibrated from equation (A.ii). Given the values of  2503 . 0 = α  and  0295 . 0 ) 1 ( = − − ε α , the labor 
share is found to be  7202 . 0 = ε . The value of  0 θ  (the extraction technology parameter) is 
calibrated from equation (A.i); this gives  7593 . 4 0 = θ . Note that these calibrated parameter values 
did not require any data on η. We also report that (A.ix) and (A.vii) imply respectively 
                                                                                                                                                                  
problem. Note that since we use data on collected tax revenue, a similar problem does not arise in the case where rent 
seeking takes the form of tax favors. 
  123169 . 5 / = y k  and  , which are the two capital stocks, private and public, as shares 
of output.
8714 . 0 / = y k
g
16 An implied value of η can follow from (A.viii) and is found to be 0.78.  
For the simulations below, we will also need to specify the parameters (autoregressive 
coefficients and variances) of the stochastic exogenous processes in (12a)-(12f). The coefficients 
t i g ρ ρ ρ , ,  and the associated standard deviations,  t i g σ σ σ , , , in (12b)-(12d) are estimated via OLS 
from their respective   processes. Concerning (12a), we follow usual practice (see e.g. 
McCallum, 1989) by choosing the volatility of the Solow residual, 
) 1 ( AR
a σ , so that the actual and 
simulated series for GDP have the same variance. By the same token, we choose the persistence of 
the Solow residual,  a ρ , so that our simulated series of output mimics as close as possible the first-
order autocorrelation of the actual series of output. All this is achieved when  0063 . 0 = a σ  and 
99 . 0 = a ρ  respectively. Finally, we choose to treat   and   in (12e)-(12f) as constant over time. 
This is justified by the fact that the tax rates change infrequently via tax reforms rather than 





Table 2 reports the model’s long-run solution. This solution follows if we use the values in 
Table 1 into equations (A.i)-(A.v), (A.vi’) and (A.vii)-(A.ix) in Appendix A and solve for the 
model’s endogenous variables. In this solution, we have set the annual long-run public debt-to-
output ratio to be  , or 2.4 on a quarterly basis, which is the reference rate of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, and allow the long-run public consumption-to-output ratio,  , to be endogenously 
determined; its solution is  . Thus, government consumption as a share of GDP should 
fall from 0.2041 in the data to 0.1557 to be consistent with the exogenous debt-to-output ratio. The 





8809 . 0 = η  and  1807 . 0 = θ . Thus, agents allocate only 88.09% of their 
effort time to productive work, while the rest   goes to rent seeking. As a result, rent seekers 
grab   of collected tax revenue. The latter translates to   of total transfers or   
of GDP, denoted as   and 
% 91 . 11
% 07 . 18 % 60 . 34 % 01 . 7
t g r / θ y r / θ  respectively in the tables.
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3.2 Sensitivity analysis of the long run solution   
We now use the long-run solution to check comparative static properties. To save on space, we 
focus on the behavior of the economy-wide degree of extraction (01 θ ≤ < ) and of long-run output 
                                                 
16 The AWM database does not report data on private and public capital. We choose to calculate the two long-run 
capital output ratios rather than to construct the respective series by using e.g. a perpetual inventory method.  
17 Although these numbers may seem high, it is important to point out that total transfers as a share of GDP 
( 0 /
tt s gy ≡ ) and total transfers as a share of tax revenue ( ) are respectively as high as 0.2026 and 0.5378 in the 
data (these are data averages) and also to remind the popular belief that a large part of transfers is the result of interest 
groups pressure. Moreover, our solution numbers are lower than previous estimates of rent seeking based on partial 
equilibrium and proxy calculations (see e.g. Mueller, 2003, p. 355, for a review). 
r g
t /
  13( ), and how these two key endogenous variables are affected by exogenous variables and 
calibrated parameters. Specifically, we report the effects of the income tax rate (
y
0
y τ ), the 
consumption tax rate ( 0
c τ ), the extraction technology parameter ( 0 θ ), capital productivity (α ), the 
growth rate of labor augmenting technology ( z γ ) and labor productivity (ε ).   
Numerical solutions are illustrated in Table 3. An increase in any of the tax rates ( 00 ,
yc τ τ ) 
pushes individuals away from productive work to rent seeking (i.e. it increases θ ) and damages the 
pie (i.e. it reduces  ). An institutional deterioration (i.e. a higher  y 0 θ ) has similar effects, namely it 
leads to higher θ  and lower  . Increases in capital productivity and labor augmenting technology 
(i.e. higher 
y
α  or  z γ ) lead to higher θ  and higher  y ; thus, a higher pie triggers rent seeking, but, 
despite the adverse effects from rent seeking, the net output effect is positive. A higher ε  leads to 
lower θ  and higher  ; thus higher labor productivity pushes individuals away from rent seeking to 
productive work and this stimulates output.   
y
 
Table 3 here 
 
3.3 Calibration and long-run solution for individual euro countries 
To calibrate the model for each individual euro country, we follow exactly the same steps as for the 
euro zone. We use annual data from the OECD Economic Outlook database over the same period, 
namely 1980-2003 (some details about the data are provided in Appendix B).
18 
Table 4 presents the values of  0 θ , η,  θ ,   and 
t g r / θ y r / θ  (respectively, the calibrated 
value of the extraction technology parameter, and the long-run solutions of the fraction of effort 
time allocated to productive work relative to rent seeking, the share of tax revenue extracted by rent 
seekers, transfers due to rent seeking as a share of total transfers and transfers due to rent seeking as 
a share of output) for each country. Numbers in parentheses denote the ranking of countries with 
larger numbers indicating more rent seeking.   
The same table provides the averages of four useful time-series in the data: the income tax 
rate ( 0
y τ ), the consumption tax rate ( 0
c τ ), government transfers as a share of tax revenue ( )  a n d  
government transfers as a share of GDP ( ). Finally, for comparison with the applied literature, 
we also present a relevant popular “real world” index, namely, the ICRG index which is a widely 






                                                 
18 For Germany, we use data for the post-unification period, 1990-2003, only. Detailed calibration results for each euro 
country are available upon request.  
  14Table 4 here 
 
The calibrated values of the parameter  0 θ  provide a measure of institutional quality in the 
sense that the higher is  0 θ , the easier a given rent seeking effort can be translated into actual 
extraction (see equation (13) above). Conceptually,  0 θ  tells the same story as the ICRG index. 
Indeed, the correlation between our calibrated value of  0 θ  and the ICRG index is -0.81 (higher 
numbers of the ICRG index denote better outcomes, hence the minus). Apart from small 
differences, both measures seem to classify countries into two subgroups. Based on the calibrated 
values of  0 θ , in the “good” subgroup, Finland scores the best being followed by Austria, Belgium 
and the Netherlands. In the “bad” subgroup, Portugal is the first-worst being followed by Greece 
and Spain.     
Consider now some key endogenous variables of the model, namely the long-run solutions 
for η (the fraction of effort time allocated to productive work relative to rent seeking) and θ  (the 
economy-wide share of tax revenue extracted by rent seekers). In terms of both η and θ , Ireland 
and the Netherlands score the best (essentially zero rent seeking) being followed by Finland where 
97% η =  and  3% θ = . At the other end, Greece, Portugal and Italy are the worst with 53%, 52% 
and 32% respectively for θ . Germany follows them with  % 26 = θ . The long-run solutions for 
 (transfers due to rent seeking as a share of total transfers) and 
t g r / θ y r / θ  (transfers due to rent 
seeking as a share of output) deliver a similar message: in Greece, Portugal and Italy 16%, 13% and 
12% of GDP are grabbed by rent seekers, while Germany follows with 10%.   
As already noted, although some of our long-run solutions for θ ,   or 
t g r / θ y r / θ  may look 
high, note that total transfers as a share of tax revenue and as a share of output are also very high in 
the actual data (see   and   respectively). For instance, in Italy, total transfers as a share of 
output are 22% in the data, and then our model predicts that 12% is due to rent seeking, while in 
Germany the corresponding numbers are 25% and 10%. These results seem to confirm the belief 
that a large part of transfers arises from rent seeking activities.   
r g
t / y g
t /
Why do different countries differ? Let us focus on θ  which is the key variable in our work. 
Obviously, as we discussed in subsection 3.2 and table 3 above, the value of θ  depends on almost 
all exogenous variables and calibrated parameters. The same subsection can also give an answer to 
why different countries differ. For instance, the high values of θ  in Greece and Portugal are mainly 
due to poor institutional quality (very high  0 θ  in both countries). The high value of θ  in Germany 
is mainly due to high tax rates, especially income tax rates ( 0
y τ ), because its institutions are not that 
  15bad. On the other hand, Ireland does well (i.e. it enjoys a very low θ ) thanks to low tax rates 
( 00 ,
yc τ τ ) despite poor institutions (relatively high  0 θ ). The same happens in Spain to a smaller 
extent. Finland and the Netherlands enjoy low rent seeking mainly thanks to their good institutions 
(low  0 θ ) despite high tax rates.       
 
4. Linearized model and simulation results  
 
We continue with simulation results for the euro area as a whole. We study second moment 
properties and impulse response functions. We start with the linearized decentralized competitive 
equilibrium.  
 
4.1 Linearized Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium   
We linearize (14a)-(14i) around the long-run solution (see Appendix A for the long run). Define 
, where  ) ln (ln ˆ x x x t t − ≡ x is the model consistent long-run value of a variable  . It is then 
straightforward to show that the linearized DCE is a system 
t x
[ ] 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 1 1 0 1 1 = + + + + + z B z B x A x A E t t t t , 
where  [] ′ ≡ t t
g
t t t t
b






t t t s s s A z ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ˆ  and   
are constant matrices of dimension 10x10, 10x10, 10x6 and 10x4 respectively. The elements of   
follow the   processes in (12a)-(12d) - recall that tax rates have been assumed to be constant. 
Thus, we end up with a linear first-order stochastic difference equation system in ten variables, out 
of which three are predetermined ( ) and seven are jump ( ). To solve 
it, we use the solution methodology in Klein (2000). We report that, when we use the calibrated 
values in Table 1, all eigenvalues are real and there are three eigenvalues with absolute value less 
than one, so that the model exhibits saddle-path stability.  
0 1 0 1 , , , B B A A
t z ˆ
) 1 ( AR
t
g
t t k k b ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
t t t
b
t t t t k h r y c i 2 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ η
 
4.2 Second moment properties for the euro zone  
We simulate our model economy over the period 1980-2003 and evaluate its descriptive power by 
comparing the second moment properties of the series generated by the model to those of the actual 
euro zone data. For comparison, we also report the performance of the same model without rent 
seeking (i.e.  1 = t η  and hence  0 = t θ  at all  ). To get the cyclical component of the series, we take 
logarithms and apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 for both the 
simulated and the actual data. We study the volatility, persistence and co-movement properties of 
some key variables,        
t
h k k w h y h i c y
g η η, , , , , / , , , ,.
  16Tables 5, 6 and 7 summarize, respectively, results for standard deviation (relative to that of 
output), first-order autocorrelation and cross-correlation with output. This is done both for the 
simulated series and the actual data.  
We start with relative volatility. Inspection of Table 5 reveals that the model does quite well 
in predicting the standard deviation of the key macroeconomic variables relative to that of output. 
Specifically, the full model does a bit better than the same model without rent seeking in terms of 
consumption volatility (the latter is 0.9578 in the data, while the model with rent seeking and the 
same model without rent seeking predict respectively 0.7158 and 0.565) and somehow worse in 
predicting investment volatility (4.3504 in the data, 2.1482 and 2.6715 in the models with and 
without rent seeking respectively). But the full model does much better in terms of volatility of 
hours at work (the relative volatility is 0.5206 in the data, while the model with rent seeking and the 
same model without rent seeking predict respectively 0.4736 and 0.0927).  
 
Table 5 here 
 
The channel through which rent seeking improves consumption and hours volatility will 
become clearer when we present impulse response functions below. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
point out the following at this stage. One of the weak points of the standard RBC model has been 
the difficulty with its prediction that hours at work are not volatile enough relative to output (see 
e.g. the review papers by King and Rebelo, 1999, and Hall, 1999). The RBC literature has therefore 
searched for mechanisms that can predict higher hours volatility. Rent seeking provides such a 
mechanism by distinguishing between effort time devoted to productive work,  t th η , and effort time 
devoted to rent seeking,  t t h ) 1 ( η − . As the impulse response functions below confirm, this happens 
because, once there is a shock, the fraction of effort time devoted to productive work,  t η , and the 
time devoted to productive work,  t th η , move in opposite directions, so that total effort time,  , has 
to overshoot its value relative to standard RBC models.
t h
19  
We continue with persistence results reported in Table 6. Both models do well by predicting 
high persistence, although not as high as observed in the data (except for that of   which is well-
matched). The result that rent seeking does not affect the persistence behaviour is not surprising: the 
way we have modelled rent seeking does not add any new, extra mechanism through which shocks 
propagate their effects over time. 
h y/
                                                 
19 The RBC literature has already pointed out that one way to increase the hours volatility is to introduce a “third use of 
time”, in addition to work and leisure (see King and Rebelo, 1999, and Hall, 1999). Our rent seeking activity plays this 
very role of a third use of time. Alternative third uses of time could be home production (see e.g. Greenwood et al., 
1995) and human capital (see e.g. Jones et al., 2005). 
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Table 6 here 
 
Concerning cross-correlations with output, as can be seen in Table 7, both models give 
similar results. They do well in terms of sign and, to some extent, magnitude, although the predicted 
contemporaneous cross-correlation coefficients are higher than in the data.  
 
Table 7 here 
 
To summarize, our model economy does well in reproducing several of the key stylized 
facts of the euro economy. More importantly, it scores better than the same model without rent 
seeking in terms of hours at work volatility. Our model does better because, once there is a shock, 
the fraction of total hours at work allocated to productive work and the hours of productive work 
move in opposite directions, so that total hours at work have to overshoot their value relative to 
standard RBC models. In other words, we distinguish hours at work as observed in the data (which 
can also include rent seeking activities like trade unionism, lobbying, etc) from hours of productive 
work.  
 
4.3 Impulse response functions for the euro zone  
We compute the responses of the key endogenous variables (measured as deviations from their 
model-consistent long-run value) to a unit shock to the exogenous processes. We examine 
temporary shocks to total factor productivity, government consumption and government investment. 
Results are reported in Tables 8a-8c respectively. We also report what happens in the same model 
without rent seeking (see Tables 9a-9c).   
 
Tables 8a-8c and 9a-9c here 
 
Table 8a reports the effects of a temporary shock to total factor productivity,  . As is 
standard, an increase in   leads to more time allocated to productive work (i.e. 
t A
t A t th η  rises). At the 
same time, in our model, an increase in   signals a larger contestable pie that pushes individuals to 
devote a larger fraction of hours at work to rent seeking (
t A
t η  falls initially). As a result,   has to 
overshoot its value relatively to standard RBC models.  
t h
The full story is as follows. An increase in   increases income and this supports a rise in 
both current and - via consumption smoothing - future consumption. Since leisure is also a normal 
t A
  18good, both current and future leisure have the tendency to follow consumption, namely to rise (or 
equivalently   to fall). Nevertheless, a higher   also raises labor productivity and the real wage 
(as well as output, investment and capital) and creates a substitution effect that works in opposite 
direction by increasing the time spent in productive work, 
t h t A
t th η . Here the latter effect dominates so 
that the net effect on  t th η  is positive. This is as in most of the literature (see e.g. Kollintzas and 
Vassilatos, 2000). Here there is an extra effect due to rent seeking. Since  t η  has fallen,   has to 
rise more relatively to standard models to support the higher value of 
t h
t th η .     
Table 9a reports the effects of the same productivity shock when there is no rent seeking. 
Inspection of Tables 8a and 9a reveals that in 8a private consumption ( ) jumps initially more, and 
then falls more abruptly, relative to 9a. Thus, extraction from state coffers allows a temporary 
spending euphoria, of course only for private consumption to fall sharply afterwards when the 
adverse effects of rent seeking (see the Introduction for the social costs of the latter) start kicking. 
Note this can also explain the higher consumption volatility in Table 5. Rent seeking in Table 8a 
also produces a big jump in hours at work ( ) relative to that in Table 9a (this is the overshooting 
effect discussed above). Note that this can also explain the higher hours volatility in Table 5.  
t c
t h
Table 8b reports the effects of a temporary shock to government consumption as a share of 
output,  . An increase in   creates a negative wealth effect that reduces consumption, investment 
and (after the demand stimulant fades away) output. Concerning leisure, there are two opposite 
effects. On the one hand, because of lower income, leisure tends to fall (or equivalently   tends to 
rise) like consumption. On the other hand, a higher   lowers the return to labor (the wage rate) and 








t th η ), which 
can be achieved by lower  t η  and/or lower  . Here, as the impulses show, the former (i.e. income) 
effect dominates so that both   and 
t h
t h t th η  rise. The rise in hours of productive work ( t th η ) is rather 
standard in the RBC literature. But here we have an additional effect: the lower return to productive 
work implies a lower  t η . In other words, individuals switch to rent seeking. Since  t η  falls,   has 
to rise more relatively to standard models to support the higher value of 
t h
t th η . 
Comparison of Table 8b to Table 9b reveals that the initial fall in consumption,  , is larger 
in 8b; this is because aggressive rent seeking activities (lower 
t c
t η ) allows a smaller initial reduction 
in wealth. By contrast,   jumps much more in Table 8b than in 9b; this is due to the overshooting 
effect.  
t h
  19Finally, Table 8c reports the effects of a temporary shock to government investment as a 
share of output,  . Although the response of the economy to a change in   resembles that to a 
change in   in the very short run, after some time private consumption, investment and capital all 
rise above their initial long run values. Output and wages are also higher all the time contrary to 
what happened with an increase in  . Thus, after some periods of time, a shock to   works like a 











t A t η ,  t th η  and   in Table 8c are the 
same as those in Table 8a.   
t h
Comparison of Table 8c to Table 9c tells the same story as with shocks to productivity and 
government consumption. Namely, because of the overshooting effect,   jumps much more in 
Table 8c than in Table 9c.    
t h
 
5. Concluding remarks and possible extensions   
 
The paper has incorporated rent-seeking competition from state coffers into a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model. It then calibrated the model to the euro area over the period 1980-2003. 
The main result is that rent seeking matters to the macro economy in Europe. We also obtained 
quantitative information about the fraction of social resources taken away by rent seekers and 
explained why different countries may differ in the degree of rent seeking.   
We close with possible extensions. It is interesting to include government expenditure on 
law enhancing activities (police, courts, tax inspectors, prisons, etc) and examine its implications. If 
this can reduce rent seeking (this could happen by decreasing  0 θ  in equation (13)), it will help the 
aggregate economy. It is also challenging to endogenize the policy decisions.     
  20 
APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Long-run equilibrium of (14a)-(14i) 
In the long run, there are no shocks and variables remain constant. Thus,  , where 
variables without time subscript denote long-run values. Equations (14a)-(14i) imply:  
x x x x t t t ≡ = = − + 1 1
) 1 (
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0 1 = + − δ γ γ  (A.vii) 
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z n = + − δ γ γ 1  (A.ix) 
which is a system in  . If we set 
b g r b h i k c k y , , , , , , , , η y b 4 . 2 =  (i.e. the public debt-to-GDP ratio is 
60% on an annual basis, which is the EU reference rate in the long run), then one of the other five 
policy instruments should follow residually to satisfy the government budget constraint (A.vi). We 
choose the long-run government consumption-to-GDP ratio ( ) to play this role. 
c s0
 
As said in subsection 3.1, to cope with measurement problems, we assume that rent seeking takes 
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h s d s
y c
t t 0 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( ) (
τ τ
η θ  and   is the mean of the time-series of transfers in 
the data (equivalently,   in (10) in the text, where   denotes the time-series 
of transfers in the data). Therefore, the long-run system consists of equations (A.i)-(A.v), (A.vi’) 
and (A.vii)-(A.ix). Only (A.v) and (A.viii) are left with unobservable variables.   
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Appendix B: Data for individual countries  
For individual EU-12 countries, we use annual data from the OECD Economic Outlook to 
construct the data averages as for the euro zone case. Concerning the depreciation rates and the 
growth rate of the labor augmenting technology, we set (on annual basis)   and  0.1 pg δδ ==
1.035 z γ =  for each country (as we did for the euro area as a whole). For the real government 
interest rate, we use the “benchmark risk free” Treasury bill interest rate as implied by the World 
Bank’s database World Development Indicators (the source is the IFS). Since this is not available 
for Austria and Finland, we use the euro zone value of   annually for these two countries. With 
respect to  , we use data for average hours at work per week when available in the OECD 
Economic Outlook database. Since such data are not available for Austria, Greece and Portugal, for 
these countries, we work as in the euro zone above. Finally, for those countries with an average 
annual public debt-to-GDP ratio ( ) higher than 0.6, we set 
036 . 0
h
y b/ 6 . 0 / = y b  and let   to follow 
residually, as explained in Appendix A. In those countries with an average annual public debt-to-
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Description Value  source 
α   private capital share in production  0.2503  Calibrated from (A.ii) 
ε   labor share in production  0.7202 
Calibrated as 
i s0 1 − −α  
p δ   private capital depreciation rate (quarterly)  0.0250  Set 
g δ   public capital depreciation rate (quarterly)  0.0250  Set 
0 A   long run aggregate productivity  1.0000  Set 
z γ   growth rate of labor augmenting technology  1.0088  Data 
μ   consumption weight in utility function  0.3713  Set equal to    h
σ   curvature parameter in utility function  2  Set 
n γ   growth rate of population  1  Set 
β   time discount factor  0.9912  Calibrated from 
(A.iii) 
ψ   substitutability between private and public 
consumption in utility  0 Set 
0 θ   extraction technology parameter  4.7593  Calibrated from (A.i) 
c s0   government consumption to output ratio   0.2041  Data 
i s0  government investment to output ratio   0.0295  Data 
t d s 0 ) (   government transfers to output ratio   0.2026  Data 
y
0 τ   average income tax rate  0.2800  Data 
c
0 τ   average consumption tax rate  0.1700  Data 
a ρ  Persistence  parameter  of    t A 0.9900 Set 
g ρ   Persistence parameter of   
c
t s 0.9933 Estimation 
i ρ   Persistence parameter of   
i
t s 0.8477 Estimation 
t ρ   Persistence parameter of   
t
t s 0.9871 Estimation 
a σ   standard deviation of the innovation   
a
t ε 0.0063 Set 
g σ   standard deviation of the innovation   
g
t ε 0.0121 Estimation 
i σ   standard deviation of the innovation   
i
t ε 0.0073 Estimation 
t σ   standard deviation of the innovation   
t
t ε 0.0071 Estimation 
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y c/   consumption to output ratio  0.5694 0.6348 
y i /   Private investment to output ratio  0.18 0.18 
h  hours at work  0.3713 0.3188 
n  fraction of hours at work allocated to productive 
work 
Na 0.8809 
nh  hours of productive work  Na 0.2809 
θ   share of tax revenue extracted by rent seekers  Na  0.1807 
t g r / θ   transfers due to rent seeking as a share of total 
transfers 
Na 0.3460 
y r / θ   transfers due to rent seeking as a share of output  Na 0.0701 
y k /   private capital to output ratio  Na 5.3169 
y k
g /  public capital to output ratio  Na 0.8714 
b r   return to bonds (quarterly)  0.0089 0.0089 
y b/   public debt to output ratio (quarterly)  2.3288 2.4 
c s0   government consumption to output ratio  0.2041 0.1557 
Notes: Na denotes  non-available. 
 
   










Table 3: Sensitivity of long-run solution 
 




























































































Table 4: Rent seeking results in individual euro countries 
 
Country 
0 θ  
η  θ   t g r / θ  
 
y r / θ  
 
y
0 τ  
c
0 τ   r g
t / / t gy ICRG 
Austria  4.5 (2)  0.85 (6)  0.21 (7)  0.28 (5)  0.08 (6)  0.28 0.18 0.78  0.3  47.22 (5) 
Belgium  4.9 (3)  0.84 (7)  0.20 (6)  0.36 (7)  0.09 (7)  0.32 0.16 0.57  0.23  47.46 (4) 
Finland  4.45 (1)  0.97 (3)  0.03 (3)  0.05 (3)  0.01 (3)  0.3  0.18 0.67  0.26  48.76 (3) 
France  5.47 (5)  0.92 (4)  0.1 (4)  0.16 (4)  0.04 (4)  0.28 0.19 0.65  0.25  46.62 (6) 
Germany  5.6 (6)  0.82 (8)  0.26 (8)  0.41 (8)  0.1 (8)  0.29 0.18 0.64  0.25  48.92 (2) 
Greece  7.36 (10)  0.8 (10)  0.53 (11)  0.77 (11)  0.16 (11)  0.19 0.14 0.7  0.20  34.36 (11) 
Ireland  6.5 (8)  No RS (1)  No RS (1)  No RS (1)  No RS (1)  0.2  0.14 0.67  0.18  44.37 (7) 
Italy  5.66 (7)  0.8 (10)  0.32 (9)  0.56 (9)  0.12 (9)  0.28 0.16 0.58  0.22  40.90 (8) 
Netherlands  5.36 (4)  No RS (1)  No RS (1)  No RS (1)  No RS (1)  0.3  0.14 0.64  0.24  49.40 (1) 
Portugal  7.58 (11)  0.81 (9)  0.52 (10)  0.71 (10)  0.13 (10)  0.18 0.11 0.74  0.18  40.13 (10) 
Spain  6.56 (9)  0.9 (5)  0.19 (5)  0.28 (5)  0.05 (5)  0.22 0.1  0.69  0.19  40.4 (9) 
Notes: 
1.  0 θ  is a calibrated value, while  , n θ , and 
t g r / θ y r / θ are long-run solutions.  , ,  and  y  are data averages from OECD Economic Outlook. See the 




0 τ r g
t / / t g
2.  The ICRG index is based on annual values for indicators of the quality of governance, corruption and violation of property rights over the period 1982-1997. It has been 
constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, University of Maryland, from monthly ICRG data provided by Political Risk Services. This index takes values within the 
range 0-50, with higher values indicating better institutional quality. Our reported numbers are the averages over 1982-1997. Knack and Keefer (1995) provide a detailed 
discussion of this index.  
3.  Numbers in parentheses denote the ranking of countries in each column. A smaller number indicates less rent seeking.  
4.  The correlation between ICRG and  ( ) () { } 0,,, / , / t rg ry θη θθ θ is { } 0.81,0.49, 0.78, 0.77, 0.66 −− − − .  
 
 
 Table 5: Relative volatility,  y x s s x / ≡  
x  data full  model model without
rent seeking 
c  0.9578 0.7158 0.5650 
i  4.3504 2.1482 2.6715 
h  0.5206 0.4736 0.0927 
h y /   0.6357 0.5717 0.9103 
w  0.8307 0.9195 0.9103 
k   Na 0.2499 0.1529 
g k   Na 0.2558 0.1251 
n  Na 0.3882  
nh  Na 0.0854  





Table 6: Persistence  ) , ( 1 − t t x x ρ  
x  data full  model model without
rent seeking 
y   0.8533 0.6920 0.6852 
c  0.8339 0.7011 0.6907 
i  0.8217 0.6773 0.6693 
h  0.9512 0.6798 0.6808 
h y /   0.6824 0.7111 0.6858 
w  0.8230 0.6938 0.6858 
k   Na 0.9471 0.9479 
g k   Na 0.9505 0.9505 
n  Na 0.6798  
nh  Na 0.6798  
 
 
  27Table 7: Co-movement  ) , ( i t t x y + ρ  
  Data  full model  
x  1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i   1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i  
c  0.6725 0.8013 0.7396 0.6725  0.9906  0.7066 
i  0.7541 0.8317 0.7115 0.6661  0.9361  0.6206 
h  0.7324 0.8327 0.8700 0.6860  0.9474  0.6064 
h y /   0.7401 0.8913 0.6256 0.6423  0.9643  0.7081 
w  0.1102 0.2777 0.3643 0.6889  0.9996  0.6963 
k   Na Na Na -0.1504 0.0613 0.3413 
g k   Na Na Na -0.1103 -0.0088 0.1302 
n  Na Na Na -0.6860 -0.9474 -0.6064 
nh  Na Na Na 0.6860 0.9474 0.6064 
 
 
Table 7 (continued) 
  model without rent seeking
x  1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i  
c  0.6582 0.9810 0.6908 
i  0.5811 0.8319 0.5596 
h  0.6825 0.9710 0.6424 
h y /   0.6832 0.9997 0.6873 
w  0.6832 0.9997 0.6873 
k   -0.2036 -0.0212 0.2291 
g k   -0.1378 -0.0378 0.1035 
 
 
  28Table 8a: Full model - Response to aggregate productivity shock ( )  t A































































Table 8b: Full model - Response to government consumption shock ( ) 
c
t s




























































  29Table 8c: Full model - Response to government investment shock ( ) 
i
t s
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Table 9a: Model without rent seeking - Response to aggregate productivity shock ( )  t A





















































  30Table 9b: Model without rent seeking - Response to government consumption shock ( ) 
c
t s






















































Table 9c: Model without rent seeking - Response to government investment shock ( ) 
i
t s
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